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EDITORIAL.
ON CITING CASES.
No case should be cited unless it is relevant. The law contained in it, may be
interestingand important, but if it does not
assist in the decision of the question before the court, it is a vexatious impertinence to consume time and distract attention, by pressing it upon the notice.
But how can the relevancy of a case be
known? Clearly not, unless it is read.
Some lawyers are in the habit of casting
a fugacious glance over a case, and without consecutive reading, leaping to a conclusion concerning it. Briefs are occasionally seen, on which fully one-third or
half of the cases have no bearing on the
point at issue.
And, to read a case, is not to read the
syllabus. The syllabus is often imperfect,
and sometimes erroneous.
A prudent
lawyer will never vouch a case to support
his cohtention, when he knows only what
the reporter has chosen to put into the
head-note.
Again, to read a case, is not to read the
opinion. lany opinions are absolutely
unintelligible, unless they are read in conjunction with the report of the facts. It
may be said with safety, that not at one
time in ten, can the doctrine of a case be
confidently stated, unless the facts as well
as the argumentation of the judge, are

studied. The facts limit and qualify
the general expressions of the opinion.
In many instances, the perusal of the
history ought to precede that of the opinion, but not always. The reporter sometimes crams into the report many facts on
which the legal issue does not turn at'all,
and to which tile court gives no heed,
when writing the opinion. The reading
of the opinion first, will often shorten the
reading of the history. With which the
reading ought to begin, must be determined by the good sense of the lawyer,
and the character of the case.
.But simply to read, is not enough.
Mlany cases refuse to be understood until
they have been long reflected on; or until
they have been compared with other killdred cases. A passive-minded lawyer will
make little headway in his profession.
His mind must react vigorously on the
cases he reads; he must contemplate them
from diverse points of view. It occasionally
happens that an opinion is carelessly written, and the principles enunciated in it
are not those which have really led to the
decision. A vicious tendency to over-generalization makes the judgment of some
jurists misleading; while the value of
others is reduced by a certain crudeness of
rhetoric; a want of precision, brevity, and
lucidity. There is not infrequent demand
for more than a languid reading of a reported case, if the lawyer really intends to
understand it.

THE FORUM.
A mistake often made, is to attach an
exaggerated value to particular words and
phrases of a judge. If every judge was a
clear and accurate thinker, and was master
of a vigorously exact style, such use of his
productions might be justified. But he is
not always such. While he succeeds in
stating his meaning on a page, it may be
sprinkled profusely with words and
phrases that considered out of relation with
the context would be extremely deceptive.
The lawyer must be a good thinker, and a
good reader, in order to comprehend the
decisions. No man can be a good lawyer
who is only a lawyer. General training
is indispensable to high efficiency. The
art of citing cases is one which the careful
lawyer will not neglect to acquire.

HON. WV.

B. HORNBLOWER.

Hon. William B. Hornblower, as has
already been announced, will deliver the
Baccalaureate Address before the graduating class in June next. Mr. Hornblower
comes of a distinguished family of New
Jersey. An alumnus of Princeton University, whence he graduated in 1871, he
for a short time prosecuted theological
studies inAlleghenySeminary. Hethen decided to adopt the profession of thelaw, and
began his legal preparation under the auspices of the firm of Carter & Eaton, of New
York City. He about the same time, entered the Columbia Law School, whence
he graduated in Mav 1875, with distinction, receiving the degree of LL. B. On
the completion of his studies, he became a
member of the firm with which he had
commenced them. Some years later, an
important commission was appointed by
the governor of New York, to project a revision of the judiciary article of the constitution of that state. Mr. Hornblower was
one of the most important members. In
September 1893, Mr. Cleveland, then President of the United States nominated Mr.
Hornblower to be an associate justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States,
to succeed Justice Blatchford. He failed
of receiving confirmation because of the
factious opposition of David B. Hill, then
a senator from New York. His career has
been one of great professional activity and
achievement. He has delivered many important addresses, not only political, but

literary and scientific. He is deeply interested in sociological investigations.
In
October 1895, he delivered the annual address before the Bar Association of the
State of Georgia. A few months ago, he
was a guest of honor of the Union League,
of Philadelphia, on an important occasion.
In February 1895, Princeton University,
his Alma Mater, conferred on him an honor
in the bestowment of which she is uniformly scrupulous, the degree of Doctor of
Laws.
In the great metropolis of the United
States, Mr. Hornblower is one of the foremost practitioners, and he holds a high
place among the jurists of the Englishspeaking world. He is an able speaker,
and his presence at the coming commencement will be one of the memorable events
in the history of the borough and of the
institution which he thus so graciously
serves.
Hon. W. H. Williams, judge of the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania,
is one of the subscribers for the FoRum.
In renewing his subscription, he takes
pains to remark concerning the creditable
paper. The aim of the staff is to please
the subscribers, and such words of commendation from so distinguished a jurist
are highly encouraging to all connected
with the publication of the FORUm.
On the evening of Tuesday, March 15th,
the Class of '98 of the Law School was
delightfully entertained by President and
Mrs. Geo. Edward Reed at their residence
on West High St. On this occasion the
reputation of the host and hostess for
hospitality was fully maintained, if not
surpassed. Quite a number of young ladies
from the town and college, by their presence, made the occasion all the more enjoyable. The company was most pleasantly
entertained during the evening by Miss
Radle, of the Law School, with several of
her recitations and by Dr. and Mrs. Reed
and Mr. Hugh Miller with their singing.
Mr. Morgan led the singing of college
songs and melodies.
Among those present were the following:--Dean Trickett, Miss Herman, Misses
Sellers, Miss Bushnell, Misses Robinson,
Miss Houck, Miss Lloyd, Miss Radle, Miss
McKeehan, Misses McMillan, Miss Aker,
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Miss Clough, Misses Horn, Miss Ream,
Miss Fisher and Miss Hoffman; Messrs.
Miller, H., Moser, Daniels, Berntheizel,
Betson, Caldwell, Capwell, Devall, Duffy,
Hans, Hare, Herman, Herr, Hutchinson,
Jordan, Lafferty, Line, Miller, F., Morgan, Moyer, Murr, Pepper, Roth, Snyder,
Treibly, Vowinckel and Wetzel.
THE DICKINSON SOCIETY.
At the meeting of the society held on
February 18th, the following question
formed the topic for a spirited debate;
"Resolved, That the course of the deputies
in the Lattimer shooting was justifiable."
The affirmative side was argued'by Messrs.
Roth and Laubenstein; the negative by
Messrs. Radle and Herr. Miss Radle,
Duffy and Aubrey sat as judges, their decision being unanimous in favor of the
negative.
Owing to the illness of President Sullivan, Miss Radle, the Vice-President, occupied the chair on Friday evening, February 25th, at which meeting only routine
business was transacted.
Jno. R. Miller, Esq., Secretary of the examining board of the Cumberland County
Bar, appeared;before the members of the
society on Friday evening, March 4th; and
read a paper on "Early Titles in Pennsylvania." Mr. Miller's paper was ably prepared and was carefully listened to by his
audience, and at its conclusion the society
accorded him a unanimous vote of thanks
for his unusual kindness in preparing such
a splendid article for our elucidation on
this intricate and comparatively unknown
subject.
Probably one of the most interesting
programs which has been prepared for the
benefit of the society was rendered on Friday evening, March 18th, of which the
following is a brief account:
Extemnporaneous speeches as follows:
"The Situation in the East," A. I rank
John; "Sensational Journalism," Isaiah
Scheeline; "The Embryo Lawyer," John
G. Miller.
Bliss Radle, who is a graduate of the
National School of Oratory, Philadelphia,
followed with a recitation entitled "Warwick the King Maker," after which
Messrs. Jordan and Hare for the affirmative and Messrs. Davis and Sellers for the

negative debated the question, "Resolved,
That the U. S. should declare war with
Spain." The judges for the debate were
Messrs. Freed, McMeans and Moyer of the
Allison Society who rendered their decision two for the affirmative and one for
the negative.
Every participant in the program performed his or her part in an unusually acceptable manner, concluding the work for
the past month by fully confirming the
hopes of the most enthusiastic member
and bidding fair that the future has only
good things in store for the Dickinson
Society.

THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
George Edward Mills, Esq., of the Law
School faculty, lectured before the Allison
Society Wednesday evening, March 9th,
the Dickinson Society joining with the
Allison. Mr. Mills spoke on "The Functions of a Jury in Regard to Kinds of Verdicts." He traced the powers possessed by
juries in this respect, commencing at an
early day and coming down to the present
time. The lecture was very interesting
and gave valuable instruction in that very
important line. Ir. Mills is one of the
most energetic of Cumberland county's
young lawyers, and he is forging ahead as
a very successful attorney. His lecture
was greatly appreciated, and the hearty
vote of thanks tendered him included also
a wish that he visit the society in the near
future.
On Wednesday evening, March 2nd, an
interesting case was argued by Messrs.
McMeans and Shalters for the plaintiff,
and Messrs. Haas and Wood for the defendant. It involved the question of stenographers' notes as a matter of record, subject
to correction by the court. In the absence
of the attorney from the Cumberland
County Bar who was expected, President
C. E. Daniels sat as judge The opinion
delivered was in favor of the defendant.
The Allison Society will elect officers on
Wednesday evening, March 30th, for the
balance of the school year.
Among the many promising base-ball
players in the Law School this year are,
Long, Fenton, Hartman, Hildreth, Schuyler, Freed and Weeks. A. M. Devall, '98
Law, is captain.
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ALUMNI PERSONALS.
George W. Huntley, Jr., '93, has been
elected city solicitor of Mft. Carmel.
Willis E. Mackey, '97, has been admitted
to practice at the Blair County Bar and
has opened offices in Altoona.
At an Emmet anniversary held at
Avoca, not long ago, M. J. Dixon, '96, delivered the address of the evening, on
Robert Emmet.
J. R. Campbell, '96, who is practicing in
Kane, Pa., is attorney for R. G. Dunn &
Co.
H. G. Carey, '96, is practicing successfully at Jermyn, Pa.
*

*

E. J. Jones, '96, is practicing at St.
Marys, Pa.
Frank H. Fay, '96, has been appointed
auditor to distribute the funds in the
hands of John Clark, assignee of the Williamsburg Bank, of Williamsburg, Pa.
Prof. George Edward Mills was elected
chairman of the recent Republican county
convention.
Win. H. Stamey, '96, has succeeded in
establishing a $50,000 silkmill in Reynoldsville and has been emphatically praised
for his energy and success by the county
newspapers. He was in Carlisle two weeks
ago.
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J. S. Omwake, '96, has again been elected
counsel for the Borough of Shippensburg.

The Junior Class has finished the subject of Torts and is now taking Domestic
Relations under Prof. Mills.

We clip the following from the PhilipsEx-Judge Wilbur F. Sadler, our efficient
burg Journalwith reference to one of the
instructor in the subjects of Bailments
Law School boys:
and Practice, who was unable to meet his
IW. Harrison Walker, Esq., the junior
classes for-several days owing to illness,
member of the prominent law firm of
has returned to his duties.
Fortney & Walker, of Bellefonte, who has
returned to his home after a day's trip to
J. B. T. Caldwell, '98, was in Washingthis place, is prominently looming up as a ton, D. C., recently.
candidate for the District Attorneyship.
He is one of the rising young lawyers of
Robert P. Stewart, '99, was in Huntingthe county, and his genial disposition, and ton March 14th, on legal business.
excellent qualities are continually making
G. Fred. Vowinckel, '98, visited his
him hosts of friends."
home in Clarion, Pa., recently.

James F. Santee, '96, is in the Prothonotary's office at Wilkes-Barre.

Merkel Landis, '99, made a business trip
to Chambersburg on the 5th.

We are sorry to note the death of the
father of John H. Williams, '97, which occurred at Plymouth, Pa., several weeks
ago.

B. Johnson MacEwen, '99, and Frank C.
Strouss, '98, who have been on the sick
list for several days have returned to their
work.

It is reported that Joseph Jeffreys, '96,
intends going to the Klondike in the near
future.

Devall, '98, Berntheizel, '98, and Wood,
'99, took part in the Dickinson MidWinter Sports held in the gymnasium.
March 5th.

One of the alumni writes that upon a
recent trip he was treated to a very pleasant chat with R. J. Goodall, at Tyrone,
Frank H. Fay, of Holidaysburg, and R.
A. Hendeison, of Altoona.

Alfred J. Feight, '97, post-grad., was one
of the delegates from New Cumberland to
the Republican County Convention held
in Carlisle, March 8th.
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The school is indebted to Chas. P. Addams, Esq., of the Cumberland County
Bar, Assistant to the Attorney General of
the State, for copies of the Statutes at
Large of Pennsylvania and of the Duke of

York's Laws.
Students of the Senior and Middle
classes who were acquainted with John
H. Williams, Esq., of the class of '97, were
pained to learn of the death of his father,
a few weeks ago from pneumonia. They
extend to him their sincere sympathy.
The Plume and Platter Club of the Law
School gave a rendition of Dr. Jekyll and
M'r. Hyde in the Academy of Music,
Hagerstown, Friday evening, March l1th.
The 115th annual catalogue of Dickinson College.appeared last week. The enrollment shows a total of 412 students from
15 states.
Hon. J. Al. Weakley, Prof. of the Law
of Equity, was absent last week conducting a case before the Supreme Court.
Caleb S. Brinton, Esq., of the Cumberland County Bar has been occupying the
chair of Bailments during the absence of
Judge Sadler.
The Plume and Platter Club was in
Columbia on Washington's Birthday and
gave two performances of Dr. Jekyll and
Mr. Hyde to full houses.

MOOT COURT.
JAMES CLARK vs. R. R. COMPANY.
Negligence-Snow on steps of a passenger
ear-Continuance of the storm- Question for jury.
Trespass for negligence.
GARRETT STEVENS and SAM. H. MILLER
for the plaintiff.
1. A carrier is liable for negligence in
permitting snow to remain on the steps of
its cars.-2 Am. and Eng. Encyc. 760; 27
Am. and Eng. Railroad Cases, 180; Pa. R.
R. v. White, 88 Pa. 333; Palmer v. Pa. R.
R. Co., 111 N. Y. 492.
2. A master is responsible for the negligence of his servants.-2 Brown on Neg.
1037; Hays v. Millar, 77 Pa. 238.

GEo. W. COLES and J. KIRK BOSLER
for the defendant.
1. It was not negligence to leave snow on
the steps during the continuance of the
storm.-Palmer v. R. R. Co., 111 N. Y.
488; Dougan v. Champlain Trans. Co., 56
N. Y. 1; Crocheron v. Ferry Co., 56 N. Y.
656.
2. The defendant's duty is to exercise
ordinarycare, and make the steps reasonably safe and adequate for ingress and
egres,.-Kelley v. Manhattan R. Co., 112
N. Y. 447; Lafflin v. R. R. Co., 106 N. Y.
136; Taylor v. City of Yonkers, 105 N. Y.
202; Stanton v. City of Springfield, 94 Mass.
566; Ring v. City of Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83.
3. Contributory negligence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On June 13, 1895, a train of the defendant
left Chambersburg for Carlisle, in the afternoon. Snow had already begun to fall,
and continued t6 fall during the entire trip.
At Carlisle the plaintiff boarded the train,
bound for Harrisburg. On arrival there,
he left the car. On the highest step of the
car there was an uneven mass of snow, solidly impacted, and as he stepped on it, carrying in his left hand a satchel weighing
205pounds, his feet slipped forward, and he
fell backwards down the steps, severely injuring himself. A rule of the company required the brakesman to keep the platform
and steps of cars free from snow, and a
shovel and broom for this object were on
the train. The other steps had been once
cleaned off before the arrival of the train
at Carlisle, but something having attracted
the attention of the brakesman, the platform and steps by means of which Clark
was leaving the car were not attended to.
CHARGE OF COURT.

The plaintiff has requested us to instruct
you, gentlemen of the jury, that it was the
unconditional duty of defendant to keep
the steps free from snow and ice, at such
times as passengers get on them, in ascending and descending, and that the omission
to do so was negligence per se. We are
unable to adopt the principle of this request. It would be extremely rash to say,
as matter of law, that, independently of
all circumstances of light or darkness, of
rigor of the cold, of violence of the tempest, of recency of the snowfall, etc., a railroad company must keep its car platforms
and steps free from ice and snow. Even
the utmost practicable vigilance and energy might, in certain contingencies, be
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unable to secure this result. Nor, are we
able to affirm the plaintiff's point, if it is
understood to prescribe a duty to the defendant, in the circumstances actually disclosed by the evidence. The cases are comparatively few in which the court determines what acts or omissions care requires
in given circumstances. The standard of
care is ordinarily to be supplied by the
minds of the jurors, to the facts as they
discover them.
The second point, of the plaintiff propounds the principlethat "if thejury are of
the opinion that reasonable care required
the freeing of the steps from snow, the verdict should be for the plaintiff" for such
damages as he may be found to have suffered. This point may be regarded as affirming a legal truism. It is the duty of
all men to be reasonable, to exercise reasonable care, to do whatever reasonable
care dictates. If reasonable care demanded
the freeing of the steps from snow, then,
as it'is entirely evident that the steps were
not freed from snow, it is indisputable that
reasonable care was not exercised. But it
is still a question whether the evidence
submitted to the jury would warrant them
in finding that reasonable care did require
the removal of the snow.
The tendency of ice and snow to cause
men to slip and fall is well known to the
railroad and to the jury. The danger that
passengers would fall on account of ice
and snow on the car platforms and steps is
sufficiently obvious and urgent, to demand
the adoption of measures to remove them,
if reasonably practicable, or to counteract
the slipperiness caused by them, by means
of sand, ashes, saw-dust or other device.
Gilman v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 168
Mass. 454; Neslie v. Passenger Railway,
113 Pa. 300; Palmer v. Penna. Co., 111 N.
Y. 488; Weston v. N. Y. Elevated R. R.,
73 N. Y. 595. The general duty of a railroad company to adopt precautions to secure the safety of its passengers, while entering, leaving, and remaining in its cars,
is beyond question; and the avoidance of
the danger of falling, from any obvious
cause, is a hardly debatable obligation.
The company seems to admit this obligation, by requiring its brakesmen to clear the
platform and steps from snow, and to furnishing them with broom and shovel for
this purpose. The serious question in this

case is, whether there is sufficient evidence
to submit to the jury, that it was reasonably practicable to remove the snow, or to
counteract in some way the danger arising from it.
The snow was falling when the train
started at Chambersburg and Oontinued to
fall until it reached Harrisburg. It was not,
therefore practicable to keep the platforms
and steps wholly free from it all the time.
Nor was that necessary. It is only at the
stations that they are used by passengers.
We see nothing making it impossible to
prevent the accumulation of any great
depth of snow on them. A light layer of
snow would have done no harm. If the
platforms and steps had been swept at intervals, they could have been kept substantially free, and, at all events, the
"impacting" of the snow might have been
avoided. If indeed, the sweeping of the
steps were impracticable, then a carpet or
other substance might have been
stretched over them. It is the duty of
the railroad to keep its station platform
free from ice, or to put sand, ashes, sawdust, etc., over it. Weston v. N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co., 73 N. Y. 595, pnless the
character of the storm, the period of the
night, etc., prevent; Kelly v. Manhattan
Railroad, 112 N. Y. 443. The necessity of
this precaution is at least as great with
respect to car steps and platforms, Neslie
v. Passenger Railway, 113 Pa. 300, and although the movement of the cars through
a storm may prevent the effectual removal of the snow during the passagePalmer v. Pa. Co., 111 N. Y. 488, we are
not prepared to lay down the rule that it
is not the duty of a railroad company to
clear its steps. That sweeping them was
not generally impracticable is indicated
by the rule of the road requiring it, and
by the furnishing of the shovel and broom;
and that it was not impracticable upon
this trip is manifest from the fact that all
the other steps of this train had been swept
during the passage. We think therefore,
that we must submit to the jury the question whether the safety of the passengers
would suggest to a company, reasonably
solicitous for the safety of its passengers,
the propriety of sweeping the car steps;
and whether such sweeping was reasonably practicable during the trip.
The snow was impacted unevenly on
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the step. It is therefore likely that it had
been trodden on. It is possible that some
of it was on the steps before the train
started. If that was so, the excuse that
the train being in motion there is no
duty to sweep the steps, would not be applicable. We do not think however, that
the evidence is-as it was in Gilman v.
Boston & Maine R. R. 168 Mass. 454,sufficient to support any inference that
snow was on the steps at the moment of
starting. It must be assumed, we think,
that all that was on theiA when the accident happened had fallen on them during
the trip.
The defendant's point that the mere fact
that snow was on the. steps hard and slippery will not justify, the inference of negligence, is true. But this fact, and those
showing the feasibility of its removal, are
we think sufficient to submit to you as
evidence of negligence. The task is yours
to say whether the failure to clear the
steps, or to adopt some other precaution
against slipping and falling, was negligent.
PHILIP BROOKS vs. JACOB MESSER.
Negligence of incompetent fellow-workman-Liability of employer-Evidence
and knowledge of incompetency.
Trespass for negligence.
HARY M. PERSHING and ROBERT
STUCKER for the plaintiff.
1. It is the duty of an employer to provide competent fellow-workmen, and, after
knowledge acquired, the retention of incompetent workmen is negligence.-Ross
v. Walker, 139 Pa. 42; Laning v. R. R.
Co., 49 N. Y. 521; Hough v. Railway Co.,
100 U. S. 213; Wabash R. R. v. McDaniels,
107 U. S. 454; Huntingdon, etc., R. R. Co.
v. Decker, 82 Pa. 119; Harper v. R. R. Co.,
47 Mo. 567; Huntsinger v. Trexel et. al.,
181 Pa. 497.

2. John Coleman is is a vice-principal
and notice to him is notice to Messer..Ross v. Walker, 139 Pa. 42: Stephens v.
R. R. Co., 96 Mo. 207; Runtsinger v.
Trexel et. at., 181 Pa. 497; Huntingdon, etc.,
R. R. Co. v. Decker, 82 Pa. 119; Jiebbering
v. Struthers, Wells & Co., 157 Pa. 312.
3. General reputation of unfitness, and
specific acts of incompetency are admissibe as evidence.-Davis v. R. R. Co., 20
Mich. 105.
4. Contributory negligence cannot be
imputed to Brooks.-Bigelow on Torts,
368, 372, 373; Sweeney v. Old Colony R. R.,
92 Mass. 368; Newcomb v. Boston Protective Dept., 146 Mass. 596; Pa. R. R. v.

Weber 76 Pa. 157; Cleveland and Pitts. R.
R. v. i~owan, 66 Pa. 393.
J. HARVEY LINE and W. K. SHISSLER
for the defendant.
1. Contributory negligence of plaintiff.
2. Fellow-servants.-olden v. Fitchburg R. R. Co.. 129 Mass. 268.
3. Plaintiff assumed the risk and knowing of incompetency cannot recover.Frazier v. R. R. Co. 38 Pa. 104; Caldwell
v. Brown, 53 Pa. 453; R. R. Co. v. Bresmer,
97 Pa. 103; Lewis v. Seifert, 116 Pa. 628;
Mensch v. R. R. Co., 150 Pa. 598; Kinney
v. Corbin, 132 Pa. 341.
4. Plaintiff must show that the incompetency was habitual and that the
master knew of it, or was not reasonably
careful in selecting and retaining the en-ineer.-Davis v. R. R. Co., 20 Mich. 105;
keyes v. Pa. R. R., 3 East Rep. 830; Ricket v. Stephens, 133 Pa. 538; P. & R. R. Co.
v. Hughes, 119 Pa. 301; Baulec v. N. Y. &
H. R. Co., 59 N. Y. 356; Moss v. R. R. Co.,
49 Mo. 167; Wood on Master and Servant,
831; Wabash R. R. Co. v. McDaniels, 107
U. 5. 454; Sherman v. R. R. Co., 17.N. Y.
153; Patterson v. R. R. Co., 76 Pa. 389;
Ryan v. Cumberland V. R. R., 23 Pa. 384.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Messer was repairing a railroad bridge
across the Allegheny river. The men employed by him went to their boarding
places on shore, for their meals. There
were two tracks on the bridge. As Brooks,
one of these men, was returning from dinner, and was 200 feet from the end of the
bridge, a derrick car operated by A, a servant of Messer, came across from the opposite direction. Brooks at first supposed
that A would discover him, and waved his
hat to call his attention. Not noticing any
sign that A had observed him, and perceiving a train coming on the other track,
he turned about, and ran back as fast as
he could. When he was about29 feet from
the end of the bridge he was run down by
the derrick car and gravely injured. The
water was fifty feet below the bridge, and
was known by Brooks, who could not
swim, to be9 feet deep. He might possibly
have avoided collision, if he had got down
between the ties and climbed upon the
timbers which formed the frame of the
bridge, but he decided that he would not
be able to do this in time, and that the
risk of his falling into the water was great.
Messer employed as his manager, John
Coleman, who hired and discharged the
hands, and who hired A as engineer. He
had been informed that A was inattentive
and reckless, and lost self-control and
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judgment on criticaloccasions, but he said
that it didn't require much skill to run a
derrick car. It was proven by three persons that he was inattentive, excitable in
danger, that his vision was poor. One of
them stated, without objection, three occasions on which his action was negligent
and dangerous, one of which known to
Coleman had happened four days before.
Action of damages. The evidence would
warrant a finding that plaintiff had suffered $4000 damages.
OPINION OF COURT.

There can be a recovery by, Brooks only
-if the injury to him was due to the careless
or reckless conduct of A, the operator of the
derrick car. Although it is said that the
frequent drunkenness of a conductor raises
a presumption, in case of accident, that
negligence on his part caused it, Huntingdon, etc. R. R. v. Decker, 82 Pa. 119; Penna.
R. R. Co. v. Books, 57 Pa. 339, we do not
find such evidence of general excitableness,
rashness and heedlessness as would justify
the attribution of the accident to Brooks to
such qualities. There ig, however, quite
enough in the facts shown to warrant a
jury in concluding that the injury to
Brooks would not have happened if A had
been ordinarily careful. It was broad day.
The workmen were returning from dinner
at that time. Aman waving a hat is sufficiently large to arrest the eye. It is difficult indeed to see how Bro.oks was run
down, unless deliberately or with absolute
heedlessness.
But Brooks and A are fellow-workmen,
and the imputability of A's negligence to
Messer, the common employer of both, is
denied. Brooks -*heninjured was not directly engaged in work, but was simply
repairing to the place at which he intended
to work. He is, however, to be considered
as a fellow-servant at the moment of the
accident. Olsen v. Andrews, 168 Mass.
261. Now, the principle is incontestable
that when one enters into the service of
another, he takes on himself with other
risks that of negligent acts of his fellowservants, unless the master has been negligent in their selection or retention; Lewis
v. Seifert, 116 Pa. 628; Frazier v. Pa. R. R.,
38 Pa. 104. A master owes to his employee
the exercise of ordinary care in the selection of fellow employees so that they may

be careful, skillful and competent; Baulec
v. N. Y. etc. R. R., 59 N. Y. 356; Ardesco
Oil Co. v. Gibson, 63 Pa. 146, and in their
retention. He is not responsible merely
because they are unfit, but only if he had
knowledge of their unfitness when he originally employed them, or when he continued them in his employ; Huntsinger v.
Trexler, 181 Pa. 497; Caldwell v. Brown, 53
Pa. 453; or if, with proper diligence, he
would have discovered their unfitness.
Farwell v. Boston etc. Railroad Co., 4 Mete.
49; P. & R. R. R. v. Hughes, 119 Pa. 301;
Reeser v. Pa. Co., 152 Pa. 38; Mulhern v.
Lehigh Valley R. R., 161 Pa. 270; Huntingdon etc. R. R. v. Decker, 82 Pa. 119.
To retain a servant.after knowledge of his
carelessness and unfitness imposesthesame
liability for subsequent acts of carelessness
on his part as the original employment of
him with such knowledge would have
imposed.-Hughes v. B. & 0. R. R., 164
Pa. 178.
The workmen, Brooks and A, were not
employed by the defendant Messer, but
by a manager, John Uoleman, and it is
suggested that Coleman is a mere fellowemployei and that his negligence in .the
selection of A, cannot be charged on
Messer. It is well settled however, that
the employment and discharge of workmen is a function of the master, and although he may depute it to another, the
acts of his deputy are to be considered his
acts, the negligence of his deputy his negligence. Olsen v. Andrews, 168 Mass. 261;
Gilman v. Eastern R. B., 13 Allen 433;
Baulec v. N. Y. & H. R. R., 59 N. Y. 356;
Huntinglon etc. R. R. v. Decker, 82 Pa.
119; Boss v. Walker, 139 Pa. 42; Wust v.
Erie City Iron Works, 149 Pa. 263; Reiser v.
Pa. Co. 152 Pa. 38; Frazier v. Pa. R. R. 38
Pa. 108. Was there negligence then, in
the employment of A? There was not, unless (a) A was an incapable, a reckless, a
negligent person, and (b) this defect was
known, or with reasonable diligence on
their part would have been known to
Coleman or Messer.
Was A an unfit person ? Three witnesses
proved at the trial that A was an inattentive person, of poor vision, and excitable in danger. No objection was made
to their testimony. Although these alleged
defects of A were but vaguely described
by them, one of them stated without ob-
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jection three negligent acts, one of which ing the injury on Brooks. Olsen v. Anhad happened but four days before the ac- drews, 168 Mass. 261.
cident to 'Brooks. It is said that this
It is urged that the evidence showed
evidence of specific acts is incompetent; that Brooks was negligent and that for
and Frazier v. Pa. R. R. 38 Pa. 104, whose this reason he should have recovered nothdoctrine is approved in Olsen v. Andrews, ing. In his conduct on the bridge we see
168 Mlass. 261, does indeed so hold. In
no trace of negligence. It does not apHuntingdon etc. R. R v. Decker, 82 Pa. pear that he could have escaped death, if
119, the frequent disobedience of orders by he had clambered down among the timbers
a conductor, and his drunkenness, were of the bridge. But, even if he could, he is
shown and it was said by the Supreme not tobe charged with negligence because
Court, with propriety. It would seem that in a position of peril, calling for instant
specific acts, if frequent, recent and of an action, he did not select the course which
aggravated nature, might be better evi- would have been the better. 168 Mlass.
dence of unfitness, than a reputation,
261, supra.
which might bejust or unjust, founded or
Was Brooks negligent in continuing in
not founded on a sufficiently wide obser- the employment of Coleman, along with
vation of conduct. Of. Baulec v. N. Y. A? Doubtless continuing to Work with
& H. R. R., 59 N. Y. 356; Pittsb. F. W. etc. an imperfect machine, or an incompetent
R. R. v. Ruby, 38 Ind. 294; for disapprov- co-employee with knowledge of such iming comments on Frazier v. Pa. R. R. perfection or incompetence, would, ordiBut the evidence was admitted without narily preclude a recovery if any accident
objection. Even if it might have been resulted. Frazier v. Pa. R. R., 38 Pa. 104;
Hughes v. B. & 0. R. R., 164 Pa. 178; Wust
excluded had exception been made to it,
it is relevant, and in conjunction with the v. Erie City Iron Works, 149 Pa. 263. Cf.
other evidence, abundantly justifies the Rickert v. Stephens, 133 Pa. 538, and if A
inference that A was an unfit person to be was as unfit as Brooks now alleges him to
entrusted with the work with which he be, and with knowledge of this unfitness,
remained in Messer's employ, he must be
was charged.
But, it is equally important that the held to have assumed the risk of all acci-'
evidence should clearly show that A's un- dents resulting from the improper conduct
fitness was known to Coleman long enough of A. But, of this knowledge, there was
before the accident to have made it his not a scintilla of evidence. That he knew
of a single one of the careless acts of A,
duty to find a substitute for A. Coleman
knew four days before the accident, of a does not appear. He had a right to asnegligent act of A's. But, as the most sume thai, Coleman had exercised proper
careful men are occasionally negligent, care in selecting his fellow-workmen, and
such an act, would be as evidence of unfit- that tfiey possessed the ordinary prudence
ness for employment, only a scintilla, 59. and competency of such workmen.
The motion for a new trial is over-ruled,
N. Y. 356, supra. Prior to A's employment, Coleman had been informed that he and judgment will be entered on the verwas inattentive and reckless, and lost self- dict.
control and judgment on critical occasions.
Coleman minified these defects, by re- ELIZABETH RINGWALT vs. SOHN
RUPPLE.
marking that "it did not require much
skill to run a derrick-car." That, perhaps,
was quite true; but it did require some .Equitable convereion-ule in Shelly's
case-Marketabletitle.
skill; some prudence and caution. Although the evidence is not very strong of
Assumpsit.
Coleman's knowledge of A's unfitness, it
PHILIP E. RADLE and J. AusTi SuLshows that his attention ought to have
been quickened, and makes probable that LivAN for the plaintiff.
By the rule in Shelly's case, the plaintiff
had due diligence been employed, hlewould
took a fee under the will.-Sheeley v.
have known of the faults of A, in time to Neidhammer, 182 Pa. 163; Potts v. Griesehave deprived him of the means of inflict- mer, 174 Pa. 516; Potts v. Kline, 174 Pa.

THE FORUM.
513; Mason v. Ammon, 117 Pa. l27; Carroll
v. Burns, 108 Pa. 386; Criswell's Appeal,
41 Pa. 288; Physick's Appeal, 50 Pa. 128;
Doebler's Appeal, 64 Pa. 1; Smith's Appeal, 23 Pa. 9; Fulton v. Fulton, 2 Grant
28; Haldeman v. Haldeman, 40 Pa. 35;
Lehman's Estate, 3 Phila. 104; Sybert v.
Herbert, 5 Sup. Ct. 544.
" When a festive occasion your spirits unbend,
You should never forget the Professiou's best friend;

So we'll send 'round the win e, and alight bumper fill,
To the jolly testator who makes his own will.,,
-5 Sup. Ct. 537.
SAMUEL B. HARE and THOMAS B. PEPPER for the defendant.
Elizabeth Ringwalt took a life estate.Guthrie's Appeal, 37 Pa. 10; Hague v.
Hague, 161 Pa. 643; Mannerback's Estate,
26 W. N. C. 9; Rife v. Geyer, 59 Pa. 393;
Dunwoodie v. Reed, 3 S. & R. 435; Mannerback's Estate, 133 Pa. 343; Urich's Appeal, 86 Pa. 386; Myer's Appeal, 49 Pa. 112;
Forum, Vol. 1 ,p. 60; Halm V. Hutchinson,
159 Pa. 133; McIntyre v. McIntyre, 123 Pa.
335; Wright's Appeal, 89 Pa. 67; Wheeler's
Appeal, 115 Pa. 590; Sheet's Estate,52 Pa.
257; Shalters v. Ladd, 169 Pa. 509.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Jacob Lehman left a will, in which he
devised a certain farm "to my daughter
Elizabeth for the period of her natural
life, and after her death it shall be sold
and divided among her heirs." Elizabeth,
(now Elizabeth Ringwalt) who is still
alive, has two sons, John and Charles.
Her husband George Ringwalt is dead.
Elizabeth contracts to convey this farm in
fee simple to John Rupple who agrees to
pay $3000 for -it. A deed is tendered in
which Elizabeth Ringwalt and her two
sons John and Charles unite, with their
respective wives. John has two children;
Charles who is 40 years of age has none.
John Rupple declining to accept this.deed;
this assumpsit is brought to compel him
to pay the $3000.
CHARGE OF THE COURT.

This assumpsit is brought to compel
John Rupple to specifically perform the
contract which he made with Elizabeth
Ringwalt to purchase the land devised to
her. A vendee will not be required to pay
for an unmarketable title, and a doubtful
title, or one which exposes the holder of it
to litigation is not marketable, Holmes v.
Woods, 168 Pa. 530; Swayne v. Lyon, 67
Pa. 436; Herman v. Somers, 158 Pa. 424;
Speakman v. Forepaugh, 44 Pa. 373. "If
there be color of outstanding title which
may prove substantial-though there is

not enough in evidence to enable the
chancellor to say so-a purchaser will not
be held to take it and encounter the hazard
of litigation." 44 Pa. 373; 158 Pa. 424. Is
the title of Elizabeth Ringwalt an unquestionable fee-simple?
The will devises the land to her "for the
period of her natural life," and directs
that; "after her death it shall be sold and
divided among her heirs." The rule in
Shelly's case is invoked to enlarge the apparent life estate of Elizabeth .ifito a fee.
This rule is thus stated in an authoritative
text-book "When the ancestor, by any
gift or conveyance, takes an estate of freehold, and, in the same gift or conveyance,
an estate is limited, either mediately or
immediately to his heirs in fee or in tail,
the words 'the heirs' are words of limitation of the estate of the ancestor." Williams' Real Prop. 404 (17th Edit.) Cf.
Challis' Real Prop. 123. The rule postulates (1) a freehold estate in X, and (2) a
remainder in the heirs of X. M rs. Ringwalt receives, under Lehman's will, an
estate in the premises for her life. But do
her heirs receive anything therein?
After Elizabeth Ringwalt's death, the
land is peremptorily ordered to be sold.
Not the land, but its proceeds, are to go to
her heirs. This direction to sell works a
conversion of the land into money. Those
who take the money do not take the land,
Miller v. Commonwealth, 111 Pa. 321;
Coleman's Estate, 159 Pa. 231; Williamson's Estate, 153 Pa. 508; Brights' Appeal,
100 Pa. 602. Though the person to whom
the proceeds of the land are to be paid
could agree to take the land instead of the
proceeds, they would, on doing so, become
purchasers. Patterson's Appeal, 5 Cent.
457; Laird's Appeal, 85 Pa. 329; Pyles' Appeal, 102 Pa. 317. It is impossible therefore that they should take it as heirs. The
rule in Shelly's case can have no application. It is entirely clear therefore, that
Elizabeth Ringwalt has, and can convey,
only a life estate.
But, she tenders a deed executed, not
only by herself, but also by her sons John
and Charles and their wives. If the fee
simple in remainder were unconditionally
in them, their union with her, in the deed,
would pass to the grantee a perfect title.
If the right to the proceeds of the land,
when sold by the executor, at their
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mother's death, were unconditionally
theirs, their union with her in the deed
would be deemed an election to take the
land instead of the money, and their
grantee would acquire a perfect title.
Have they an unconditional right to the
proceeds? We think it certain that they
have not. The proceeds of the land are to
be divided among Mrs. Ringwalt's heirs?
She is still alive. Nemo est haeres viventis. It is impossible to aver of any person
that he is her heir, until her death. If
John and Charles survive her, they will
be her heirs. The deed, which they now
execute would estop them from disputing
the right of their grantee. But, the birth
of other children to Elizabeth, would make
such children joint heirs, and the present
deed could not bind such children. Again,
John or Charles, or both may die. If
John dies before his mother, his children
would, as "heirs" of Elizabeth, have a
right to the proceeds of the land. The
deed of their father would not estop them.
Charles now childless, may have children,
who may, he dying before his mother,
become her "heirs." It is quite evident
then that while, under certain contingencies, the deed tendered to John Rupple
might assure him a perfect title, under
other contingencies, it would give him no
more than an estate for the life of Elizabeth Ringwalt. For a title so imperfect
he cannot be compelled to pay.
You will therefore, gentlemen of the
jury, render a verdict in favor of the defendant.
JOHN BURR vs. JEMIMA SCHOULER, ET. AL.
Estate in entirety-R4usband and wife as
co-tenans-Suurvivorship-Jointestate.
Case stated.
D. EDWARD LONG and J. PERRY WOOD
for plaintiff.
FRANK B. SELLERS and WENCEL HARTMAN, Jr., for the defendant.

1. The husband and wife must be considered as one co-tenant.-Johnson v. Hart,
6 W. & S. 319; Stuckey v. Keefe's Executors, 26 Pa. 397;Barber v. Harris, 15 Wend.
616.
2. The right of survivorship cannot be
destroyed by either party and there can be
no partition of the estate.-Tiedman R. P.
p. 203; Hamm v. Meistenhelter, 9 W. 349.
3. The nature of tenancy by entirety is

not changed by the Acts of 1812, 1848, 1887
and 1893.-McConnel v. Lindsay, 131 Pa.
476; Young's Estate, 166 Pa. 645; Diversv.
Divers, 56 Pa. 106; Gillan's Executors v.
Dixon et. al., 65 Pa. 395.
4. Statutes similar to Pennsylvania have
received same construction in other states.
Hall v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 670; Beites v.
Newman, 92 N. Y. 152; Carver v. Smith,
90 Tnd. 222.
5. A purchaser at sheriff's sale, under a
judgment against husband of his interest
in an estatehIeld with his wife by entirety
can not recover possession during wife's
life.- McCurdy & Stevenson v. Canning,
64 Pa. 39.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
On 3rd Feb. 1894, C. Robbins, by deed,
naming James Schouler, Jemima Schouler, Charles Schouler and Herbert Schouler as grantees, granted, bargained and sold
a house and lot in the Borough of Newvile, unto the said James, Jemima, Charles
and Herbert Schouler, their heirs and
assigns. Jemima Schouler was the wife of
James, and Charles and Herbert were
their sons. On 11 Sept. 1895, James borrowed $1000 giving his note therefor to
John Burr. Burr on an execution upon
the judgment recovered on this note,
caused a sheriff's sale of his interest in the
house and lot, and became the purchaser.
Two months after the sale, i. e. on March
17th, 1896, James Schouler died having
continued, with his wife and sons to reside
in the house as if no sheriff's sale had
taken place. After his death, his wife and
sons made a sale of the house and lot to
Samuel Emlin, who however insisted that
they should get Burr to unite with them
in the deed. He agreed to do so, on their
consenting that the purchase money, $4000,
should be deposited in the First National
Bank until, on a case stated, it was determined whether he, Burr, was entitled to
any portion of the money, and if to any,
to how much. In pursuance of this agreement this case was stated for thejudgment
of the court; judgment to be entered for
Burr for $1000 if he is entitled to one-fourth;
or for such other sum as he should be entitled to; if entitled to nothing, then judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question to be determined is, what
estate in the land did John Burr acquire
by his purchase at the sheriff's sale? The
deed of C. Robbins, dated Feb. 3, 1894,
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would p2rima facie have constituted the
four grantees tenants in common, each
taking under it an undivided fourth.
Burr would then have gained by his purchase that fourth which was vested in
James Schouler.
It appears, however,
that James Schouler and Jemima, .were
husband and wife, and that Charles and
Herbert were their sons. It was possible
at common law, to convey land to a husband or to a wife, without the co-acquisition of a similar estate therein, by the
wife or husband. It was possible to convey an undivided half of a tract of land to
A, and, by a separate deed, another undivided half of the same tract to B, A's
wife. If before marriage, A had had an
undivided half, and B, the other half, the
marriage would not have changed the estates. What had been a tenancy in common would have continued a tenancy in
common, 2 Black. 182, n. (Lewis' Edition.)
It is possible that land should be conveyed
to a husband and wife, by the same deed,
so that an undivided half should vest in
him and his heirs, and the other undi-ided half in her and her heirs; Young's
Estate, 166 Pa. 645. It would, to effect
this result, be necessary to distinguish the
fractions, and to grant one of them to the
husband and his heirs, and the other of
them to the wife and her heirs. If the
land was conveyed to A and B, their heirs
and assigns, they would take by entirety,
although the deed expressly stated that
they were to take as tenants in common and
not otherwise. Stuckey v. Keefe, 26 Pa.
397; McCurdy v. Canning, 64 Pa. 39. Tenants in common take distinct and immiscible interests, each of which, on the death
of its owner, descends to his heirs. There
is therefore only a verbal distinction between a conveyance to A and B his wife
and their heirs, as tenants in common, and
a conveyance to A, his heirs and assigns,
of a moiety, and to B his wife, her heirs
and assigns, for the other moiety. Young's
Estate, reluctant to overthrow Stuckey v.
Keefe, compels us to say that an important
difference of legal consequences lurks in
the Adoption of one rather than the other
of these phraseologies, which to the untechnical eye, seem equipollent.
But in the conveyance to the Schoulers,
there is no express negation of a joint
estate. Had the grant been simply to

James Schoukr and Jemima. his wife, their
heirs and assigns, and not to them as tenants in common, it unquestionably would
constitute them. tenants by the entirety.
2 Black. 182; Taylor v. Birmingham, 29 Pa.
306; Fairchild v. Chastelleux, 1 Pa. 176;
Auman v. Auman, 21 Pa. 343; Martin v.
Jackson, 27 Pa. 504; Bates v. Seely, 46 Pa.
248; Diverv. Diver, 56 Pa. 106; French v. Mehan, 56 Pa. 286. A reservation of a ground
rent to husband and wife and their heirs
makes them tenants of the rent by entireties, Robb v. Beaver, 8 W. & .S. 107. A
transfer to A and wife of bank shares, Slaymaker v. Bank, 10 Pa. 373; a mortgage to
A and wife, Bramberry's Estate, 156 Pa.
628, gives them a survivorship therein. A
similar rule is applied to wills. A devise
to A and his wife makes them owner in
entireties, Holcomb v. People's Savings
Bank, 92 Pa. 338; Fleek v. Zillhaver, 117
Pa. 213. The estate which parents take
in the personalty, Gillan v. Dixon, 65 Pa.
395, or realty of their issueless child, under
the intestate law, is also an estate by entireties.
Does a different result follow from the
union with James and Jemima Schouler
of other grantees? This question is quite
distinctly Answered by Johnson v. Hart,
6 W. & S. 319. James and Jemima were
tenantslper tout, et non per mie, but they,
considered as one person, were tenants in
common with the sons. Cf. 2 Black. 182
n. (Lewis' Edition.) The amount of interest taken by husband and wife is also
determined by the hypothesis of their constituting one person. If one person is
united with them, as grantee, he takes an
undivided half, as tenant in common, and
they take the other undivided half.-Johnson v. Hart, supra. James and Jemima
Schouler under the Robbins deed acquired
a third, Charles Schouler a third, and Herbert Schouler a third.
The sheriff's sale of James Schouler's
interest took place during his lifetime. His
estate with the jus accreseendithus passed
to Burr. He could not, however, even
during James Schouler's lifetime, disturb
the possession of Mrs. Schouler.-McCurdy
v. Canning, 64 Pa. 39. James Schouler
has died. The whole third has therefore
devolved upon her. -2 Black. 182 and cases
supra. It follows that Burr has no present estate in the land, and that the $4000
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now in deposit with the 1st National Bank
must be paid to Jemima, Charles and Herbert Schouler.
Judgment for the defendants.

whatever portion of this land remains undisposed of, or whatever portion of the proceeds of any part thereof sold by Maria
Timmons shall go to John Keyes, his
heirs and assigns." Six years after the
death of Henry Hopewell, Maria Timmons
JOHN KEYS vs. TITUS TIMMENS,
found that the land was yielding her only
ET. AL.
$90 per year; that she had only $77 in
Bight of remainderman to enjoin unrea- money, and no other resources, and that
sonable sale by life-tenant.-S'alemust be her maintenance cost $200 annually. She
made in good faith and for an adequate decided to sell the land to her son for
pried.-Evidence offairprice.
$1700. Land in the neighborhood was in
much demand and she could have got for
Bill in Equity.
this, had she inquired and tried $3500. She
G. FRED. VOWINCKEL and J. HARRY
had heard that John Keyes, who owned
LINE for the plaintiff.
1. Plaintiff acquired an equitable in- the other undivided half, had said that he
terest under the will, of which Maria Tim- would pay $1700 for her half, and this demens became trustee.-Wallace v. Wain- termined her to offer it at that price to her
right, 87 Pa.. 263; Chaffees v. Risk, 24 Pa. own son, without making any effort to se432; 27 vol. Am. and Eng. Encyc. p. 3;
Perry on Trusts, vol. 1,
2-13; Ham v. cure a better price and without advice from
anyone. John Keyes files this bill in
Van Orden, 84 N. Y. 2.57; 2 Washburn on
Real Prop. 472; 2 Flint on Real Prop. 804; equity to restrain Maria Timmons from
Helfenstein's Estate, 77 Pa. 328; Wiswell selling, and Titus Timmons from buying
v. Ross, 4 Ala. 321; Simpson v. Mitchell,
the land at the price.
8 Tenn. 417.
It is hardly necessary to define the es2. A sale at such a grossly inadequate
price would be a breach of trust.-Thomas
tates which Maria Timmons and John
v. Hebenstreil, 68 Ill. 115; Warfield v. Keys acquired by this will in the land.
Ross, 38 Md. 85; 27 Am. and Eng Encyc.
233. And may be enjoined by one whose The former became a tenant for her life,
interest is merely that of a contingent re- at least. She had in addition authority to
mainder-man.-Clark v. Direaux, 1 S. Car. sell the land, and, in that way, to confer
172; 10 Am. and Eng. Encyc. 914, 915; on the purchaser a fee simple. Suchasale
27 Am. and Eng. Eucyc. 248; Lenin on
would divest whatever estate Keys had in
Trusts, 855; Perry on Trusts, 816; 2 Beach
on Injunctions, 893; Phillips v. Windsl6w, it. If the land was not sold he would take
18 Ky. 431.
it after her death. If this interest was a
vested remainder, it was liable to be diRUEL U. CAPWELL and GABRIEL H.
MOYER for the defendants.
vested, by the proper exercise of the power
Maria Timmens has full power under of sale. If the land should be sold, Maria
the will to sell the land without the permission of John Keys. Her maintenance Timmons would have a life estate in the
necessitates its sale. She has a right to money produced by it, and also the right
sell at private sale. Having availed her- to consume so much of it as her mainteself of the best natural means of informa- nance would require. The portion that
tion and exercising as much care as she should be unconsumed would, however,
would in. the sale of her own property, for
such she had a right to consider it, she pass to John Keys, as would the land,
may sell it for $1700. John Keys had no were there no .conversion. Cf. Gross v.
vested interest in the land. His interest Strominger, 178 Pa. 64; fRecks' Appeal, 78
will not support this bill. Bill should be Pa. 432.
dismissed.
Although Maria Timmons was the obOPINION OF THE COURT.
ject of the testator's chief solicitude, John
Henry Hopewell devised two tracts of Keyes was also his beneficiary. He was
land in which he had an undivided half, to take all that in the exercise of a fair
discretion, might be left, after her mainto Maria Timmons for her lifetime "with
permission to sell all or any part of the tenance was secured. It is not disputed
same, if such sale shall become necessary that she may properly sell the land. The
for her maintenance, she using so much of circumstances show that the resolution to
the purchase money as she may need, for sell is not impolitic. But, the object of
such maintenance, and after her death, the sale is to procure money out of which
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to provide a support to Maria Timmons.
The larger the sum obtained, the larger
the amount that will remain over, to be
enjoyed by the remainderman. Were she
only interested in the fund produced by
the sale, neither Keyes nor any other could
arrest her in the making of it, for however
inadequate a price. But, Keyes has an
appreciable interest in the exercise of the
power. Maria Timmons may not exercise
She may
it recklessly, improvidently.
not exercise it except to obtain the largest
amount of money that, under her circumstances can be realised. She may not sell
the land for an inadequate price to her
son. Good faith is required in the exercise of power of sale, 18 Am. & Eng. Ency.
920. A sale by an executor, under a power
to a relative, for less than might have been
obtaiued from another, will be avoided;
Oberlin College v. Fowler, 10 Allen, 545.
If a first mortgagee, with a power to sell,
sells without taking proper steps to secure
bids, for an inadequate price, the second
mortgagee will be allowed to redeem. Clark
v. Timmons, 150 Mass. 357. In Price v.
Bassett, 168 Mass. 598, a case strikingly
like the one before the court, it was held
that the power of sale must be exercised
not only with good faith, but with reasonable care and diligence.
The sale contemplated by Maria Timmons, disposes of land which is worth
$3,500 for $1,700. She has made no effort
to procure a better price. She has taken
advice from nobody. The only excuse for
accepting $1,700 is that she had heard that
John Keyes had said that he would pay
$1,700. Had he said so? Was the information she had of his statementworthy of
being depended on? Even if it was, it
does not appear that he said he would not
give more than $1,700. She did not make
any offer to him She let no one know
that she was going to sell the land at any
price, except her own son. She may well
be suspected of making the sale, not merely
to secure a support for herself, but to confer on him for $1,700 land worth twice
that amount. If the $1,700 would support
her for nine or ten years, the $3,500 would
support her for eighteen or twenty years.
She might die, at the end of the ten years.
If this sale is consummated, there would
then be no residuum for Keyes. If the
sale was made for $3,500, there would be a

residuum of $1,700 or more. We think it
quite plain therefore, that the bill discloses
a substantial ground for equitable relief.
The demurrer is therefore overruled, and
the defendants are directed to answer.
DAVID WEBSTER vs. JACOB CROWLEY.
Contract.-Offerby mail.-Acceptance by
telegraph.-Acceptance by mail.
Assumpsit.
CHAS. R. WEEKS and Wm. M. FLANIGAN for plaintiff.
1. When an offer is made and accepted
by the posting of a letter of acceptance before notice of withdrawal is received, the
contract is not impaired by the fact that a
revocation had been mailed before the letter of acceptance. Patrick v. Bowman,
149 U. S. 412; Hamilton v. Lycoming Ils.
Co., 5 Pa. 342; Boston & M. R. R. Co. v.
Bartlett, 3 Cush. 224.
2. The law presumes an offer to be made
during every instant of time, until a reasonable time has elapsed during which the
offer may be revoked or accepted. Hamilton v. Lycoming Ins. Co. supra; Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 105; Taylor v. Merchant Fire Ins. Co., 9 Howard 390.
CHAS. E. HORN and MARLIN WOLF for
defendant.
The acceptance of an offer to result in a
contract must be within the time expressly
or impliedly required by the offer.
Clark on Cont., p. 40-41; Hare'on Cont.,
p. 340-341; Taylor v. Rennie 35 Barb. (N.
Y.) 272; Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103.
Other cases cited: Lincoln v.-Erie Preserving Co., 132 Mass. 129; Lyman v. Robinson, 14 Allen 254; Schenectady Stove Co.
v. Holbrook, 101 N. Y. 45.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Crowley, in Philadelphia, on August 3,
1895, wrote to Webster in Scranton, stating that he had 100 barrels of flour that he
would sell at $4.70 per barrel, and asking
Webster if he desired to buy the flour to
"kindly wire me at my expense on receipt
of this." This telegram was received at 3
P. m., August 3, 1895. At 2 P. m. of the
next day, Webster telegraphed that he
would take the flour at the price. This
telegram was never received. At the same
time a letter of the same import was
mailed, and duly received on August 4th
at 5 P. m. The flour had not then been
sold. On the afternoon of August 5th,
Crowley sold the flour for $5.45 per barrel
to another.
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In this action Webster seeks to recover
the-damages arising from the refusal of
Crowley to deliver to him the 100 barrels
of flour. His right to recover depends on
the existence of an obligation in Crowley,
and that obligation, if any there be, arises
out of a contract. Was there a contract?
The letter of August 3, 1895, must be considered to be more than an invitation to
deal. It specifies 100 barrels of flour,
names the price at which Crowley will sell
it, and advises Webster if he desires to
buy to wire Crowley at his expense. It is,
clearly, an offer to sell the flour. It was
not Crowley's intention to invite offers of
price, designation of quality, etc., from
Webster. He himself named the number
of barrels and the price. There was no
room for negotiation as there was in Allen
v. Kirwan, 159 Pa. 612; Cf. Clark, Cont. 60.
At 2 p. 3. of the day following Webster's
receipt of Crowley's letter containing the
offer, he despatched a telegram accepting
it. Although this telegram was never received, it was as effectual to bind Crowley
as if it had been received. Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. L. 0. 381; Adams v. Lindsell, 1
B. & Aid. 681; Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y.,
362; 3 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 856; Clark,
Cont. 45. Its failure to reach its destination does not prevent its concluding a contract with Crowley.
But, it was not despatched until 2 P. Al.
of the day following the receipt of the offer.
Had the offer specified no time for acceptance, the acceptance must have been made
in a reasonable time. Clark, Cont. 52
The commodity with which the acceptance concerned itself was flour, whose
value, as the event shows, was unstable.
A shorter delay, therefore, would be unreasonable than if the article dealt about
had been less mutable in price. The actual
delay was 23 hours. This, we think, could
not be pronounced unreasonable by the
court. It would be necessary to submit to
the jury the question for its decision. In
Minnesota Oil Co. v. Collier & Co., 4 Dillen 431; Huffcut, Am. cases on Contracts,
46, a delay of one day in accepting by telegraph, an offer made by telegraph, was
said by the court to be too long, but the
subject matter was oil, the fluctuations in
whose value were sudden and violent, and
it does not appear whether the court was
trying the action without a jury.

But, the offer specified how and when it
should be accepted. If Webster desired
to buy, he was advised "to kindly wire
me (Crowley) at my expense, on receipt of
this." Had a delay of a day in notifying
an acceptance been in contemplation, why
direct the use of the telegraph? But, what
significance are we to attach to the words
"on receipt of this? I Would an answer
three days or two days, after the receipt,
have been an answer "on receipt?" Nor,
do we think, is an answer 23 hours after
the receipt, an answer on receipt. In view
of the changeable value of the flour, the
designation of the telegraph as a means of
communication, and the request for an
answer" on receipt of this," the conclusion
is unavoidable that a prompter acceptance
than that made by Webster was required
by Crowley. It follows that, when the
proper time, an hour or two, had elapsed,
after the receipt of the letter, the offer contained in it expired, and it could not be
accepted afterwards. Clark, Contracts 52.
Cf Horne v. Niver, 168 Mass. 4, where in
response to a similar offer, a telegraphic
acceptance, despatched two days after the
sending of the offer, was held to be too
late.
The letter sent by Webster is without
effect. It was not sent any earlier than
the telegram. The offer called for a telegraphic answer, and not an answer by
post. Eliason v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat, 298;
Clark Cont. 39.
It follows that no contract was ever
made between the plaintiff and the defendant. Judgment will be entered for the
defendant on the point reserved.
JOHN CHASE vs. AMOS PATRICK.
Deceit-Statements as to another's financial standing-Intentto deceive may be
ihferred.from circumstances.
Trespass.
ADAIR HERMAN and CHARLE

E. DAN-

IELS for plaintiff.

Having a legal right to rely (Am. &
Eng. Encyc. Vol. 5, p.'333) and having in
fact relied upon the representations of the
defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the injury done him. Cox v.
Highley, 100 Pa. 249; Griswold v. Gebbie,
126 Pa. 853; Sutton v. Morgan, 158 Pa.
204. The representation may be false,
made recklessly, as of one's own knowl-

THE FORUM.
edge, or under a duty. Dilworth v. Bradner, 85 Pa. 238; Dul v. Williams, 85 Pa.
490; Freyer v. McCord, 165 Pa. 539; Land
& Imp. Co. v. Wendinhall, 4 Sup. Ct. 398.
The misrepresentation may be by silence
Am. & Eng: Encyc.
or concealment.
Vol. 6, p. 336; Rhode v. Alley, -7 Tex. 443.
Ignorance of the plaintiff. Redgrave v.
Hurd. 20 L. R. Ch. D. 1; Forum, Vol. 2, p.
51. The representation was intended to be
acted upon, and was in fact relied upon
with resulting damage. Boyd v. Shiffer,
150 Pa. 100; David v. Park, 103 Mass. 501;
Weist v. Grant, 71 Pa. 95.
ALBERT T. MfORGAN and PnANK T.
MORROW for the defendant.
Plaintiff must prove fraud. Kane v.
Weigley, 22 Pa. 179; King v. Eagle Mills,
92 Mass. 548. A matter of opinion cannot
be ground for fraud. Watts v. Cummins,
59 Pa. 84. Equal means of knowledge excuses. Clark v. Everett, 63 Pa. 347; Brown
v. Leach, 107 Mass. 364; Fisher v. Worrall,
5 W. & S. 478. There was no intention to
Duff v. Williams, 85 Pa. 490;
defraud.
Kern v. Simpson, 126 Pa. 42; Lamberton
v. Dunham, 165 Pa. 129; Boyd v. Brown,
6 Pa. 316; Iron Works v. Barber, 106 Pa.
125; Bookee v. Walker, 14 Pa. 142; Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353; Dilworth v.
Bradner, 85 Pa. 238; Cox v. Higley, 100
Pa. 252.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Chase sold coal for $800 to Patrick, receiving $600 in cash and a note for $200,
made by one George Tolman, payable to
bearer. Chase demurred at first, but Patrick said that he had known Tolman for
five years and that that note or any for as
much as $1000 was as "good as gold."
Chase then asked what Tolman's business
was, and was correctly informed that he
was a carpenter of steady habits and had
regular employment at which he earned
$16 per week. He asked what property, if
any, Tolman had, and Patrick stated that
he owned the home worth $2400 in which
he lived. He was not asked about any
liens on it but he truthfully added that he
did not know whether there were any
such liens. There was in fact a mortgage
for $1000 upon it. The house had been
conveyed to Tolman five years before, but
four years before he had conveyed it to X
in trust for his, Tolman's, wife and heirs.
Demand for payment of the note having
failed to procure payment, Chase learning
that such would be useless, brought tres
pass against Patrick for deceit The plaintiff having recovered a verdict, this is a
motion for a new trial.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

Chase has sold $200 worth of coal to
Patrick, for a note for $200, made by Geo.
Tolman, and payable to bearer. He was
unwilling to accept this note until he was
assured by Patrick, (a) that he had known
Tolman for five years; (b) that a note of
Tolman's for as much as $1,000 would be
"as good as gold;" (c) that Tolman was a
carpenter of steady habits, and regular
employment, earning $16 per week; (d)
that he owned his home, and that it was
worth $2,400; (e) and that he did not know
whether there were any liens upon it. The
acceptance by Chase of the note followed
these representations. Chase's effort to
procure payment of the note has been unfruitful, and Tolman is insolvent. In this
action Chase seeks indemnification for the
loss, arising from Patrick's alleged deceit.
Of the representations made by Patrick,
it is averred that (b) and (d) were false.
The first of these is the statement that the
note for $200, offered to Chase was, or any
note of Tolman's for as much as $1,000,
would be, as "good as gold." It is quite
clear that the note sold to Chase was not
as good as gold nor even as silver, nickel,
or copper. It was absolutely worthless.
It is suggested however that what Patrick said about it, was simply the expression of an opinion, and that consequently
no responsibility attaches to it even if the
opinion thus expressed, did not correspond with that which was actually entertained by Patrick. In a sense, an assertion of the financial capacity of a man to
pay a particular debt, is the assertion of
an. opinion, but the cases are not rare in
which for such an assertion, when the
opinion expressed is not in fact entertained, responsibility to the party betrayed into relying upon it, has been affirmed. 1
Jaggard, Torts, 579. In Graham v. Hollinger, 46 Pa. 55, a false statement that X,
to whom A was about to sell goods, was
a person of responsibility, to whom A
might safely sell the goods, on credit, was
actionable. Cf. Duff v. Williams, 85 Pa.
490; Boyd v. Browne, 6 Pa. 310; Bokee v.
WValker, 14 Pa. 139. The expression 'as good
as gold," may, it is said, be the expression
ofan opinion, or of a fact, Stubbs v. Johnson, 127 Mass. 219; Andrews v. Jackson,
168 Mass. 266. The object of Patrick in stating the opinion, if opinion it was, was to
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induce Chase, as a consequence, to receive
the- Tolman note. He expected that
opinion to influence Chase's action. He
was bound to exercise as good faith, in
the expression of it, as in the expression
of any fact. 1 Jaggard, Torts, 579, supra.
Did he exercise this good faith? He is
not liable merely because his assertion
that the note was "as good as gold" was
untrue. If he really believed the note as
good as gold, " the reasonableness of his
ground for that belief could not be called
into question." Lambertoh v. Dunham,
165 Pa. 129; 1 Jaggard Torts, 566; Dilworth
v. Bradner, 85 Pa. 238; Bokee v. Walker,
14 Pa. 139; Cox. v. Highley, 100 Pa. 249.
But, is there evidence froan which the inference could be properly drawn that he
did not believe what he said? Theburden
is on the plaintiff to prove his bad faith;
not on him to prove his good faith. If it
appeared that there were no facts concerning Tolman that could have led any man
acquainted with them, to have believed
him able to pay a note for$1000, from that
absence of such facts, the jury would be
warranted in inferring that Patrick's assertion was made without corresponding belief. We do not think such inference is
warranted by the actual evidence. It is
not shown that Tolman was not a carpenter, of steady habits, and regular employment, earning $16.00 per week; and it is
possible that Patrick inferred from these
facts, the state of Tolman's family, and
other circumstances, known to him, that
a note of $1000 could be collected.
The second untrue statement was concerning a definite fact. Patrick said that
Tolman owned his home worth $2,400; and
this was untrue. No circumstances appear which suggest how Patrick could
have been led to believe what he thus affirmed. Although five years before, the
house had been conveyed to Tolman, he
had, four years before, conveyed it to a
trustee for his wife and her heirs. While
it is possible that he had known of the conveyance to Tolman and had never heard
of the conveyance by Tolman, we think,
the making of the statement being unexplained, that a jury might legitimately
infer that it was made, if not with knowledge of its untruth, at least without belief
of its truth. Lamberton v. Dunham, 165

Pa. 129; Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353;
Hexter v. Bast, 125 Pa. 52.
The materiality of the representation
was not seriously disputed, nor the fact
that it induced the decision of Chase to
accept the $200 note. We discover no
error in the trial of the action, and the
motion for a new trial is overruled.
.MARY SELLERS vs. JOHN FOWLER.
Bight to recoverfor the murderof husband.
-Merger of civil action into felony.Appearanceby attorney waives service.
Tresrass.
CHARLES

MO
cMEANS

and

DANIEL

R.

REEsE for the plaintiff.
1. A right of action in case of death of
the husband by unlawful violence accrues to the widow by the acts of April
15, 1851; P. L. 674, 19; April 26, 185.5; P.
L. 309. Nive v Smiley, 125 Pa. 136; Fink
v. Garman, 40 Pa. 95; Sedwick on Damages,
177; North Penn R. Co. v. Robinson, 44
Pa. 178; Penn R. Co. v. McCloskey's
Admrs., 23 Pa. 526.
2. The writ of summons is served by
leaving a copy at his dwelling house in
the presence of an adult member of the
family. Act of June 13, 1836; P. L. 568,
2; Pepper and Lewis Digest, vol. 2, p. 3569; McEwen v. Horten, 1 C. C. 498; Bujacv.
Morgan, 3 Yeates 258; Winrow v. Raymond, 4 Pa. 501.
3. If the defendant fails to appear judgment may be entered by default.-Act of
April 22, 1889, Brightly's Purdons, vol. 2,
p. 1730.
SAMUEL H. MILLER and JOHN G. IILLER for defendant.
1. Fowler was not served according to
law. Bujac v. Morgan, 3 Yeates 258; Winrow v. Raymond, 4 Pa. 501; Blair v.
Weaver, 11 S. &. R. 84; 22 Am. and Eng.
Encyc. 107.
2. Judgment cannot be entered by default until service is lawfully had on
Fowler.
3. Henry Sellers was the cause of his
own injury.
OPINION OF COURT.

Henry Sellers, husband of Mary, and
John Fowler bad had business dealings,
out of which a dispute had grown, Fowler
accusing Sellers of having embezzled money. On lay 13, 1894, in an altercation,
Fowler became enraged at Sellers, and
pulling out a pistol from his pocket, aimed
it at Sellers, declaring that he would shoot
him if he did notsign a note for the amount
alleged by Fowler to have been misappro-
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priated.
Sellers refusing, and defying
Fowler to shoot, the latter shot, killing
Sellers instantly. Fowler at once fled from
the neighborhood, not communicating
with his wife and children, and he has
never since been heard from. A few days
after the occurrence, Mary Sellers, widow,
brought this action for damages against
John Fowler.
At common law, there were several obstacles to a recovery in an action such as
this. An action for personal injury abated
by the death of the injured person. The
right of action belonged to him alone, and
did not devolve upon his executor or administrator. A relative of the deceased,
had no right of action, e. g. a son or
daughter for the killing of -the parent; a
wit for the killing of the husband, or a
husband for the killing of the wife. The
19th section of the act of April 15, 1851,
and the 1st section of the act of April 26,
1853, 2 P. & L. 3233, 4, and the 21st section,
Art. III of the Constitution, 1 P. & L. 60,
correct the common law, and give inter
dula, a right of action to a widow for the
death of her husband "by unlawful violence or negligence." The death of Henry
Sellers was due to "unlawful violence."
Another common law principle was that
the civil remedy for the tort involved
in a felony, was so far merged therein
that a civil remedy for it was suspended
until there had been a conviction or an acquittal, or, some other disposition of a
prosecution for it. Addison, Torts,
46
(Edit. 1875.) In Crosby v. Long, 12 East
(1810), Ellenborough, C. J., said, "The
policy of the law requires that before the
party injured by any felonious act can seek
civil redress for it, the matter should be
heard and disposed of before the proper
criminal tribunal,in order that thej ustice of
the country may be first satisfied in respect
to the public offence; and after averdictof
acquittal or conviction the judgment is so
far conclusive in any collateral proceeding
quoad the particular rnatter,-that the objection is thereby removed, of bringing
that sub judice in a civil action, which
was the proper subject-matter of a criminal prosecutiol."
Cf. 15 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. 358. IlI Hutchinson v. Merchant's
Bank, 41 Pa. 42, it is held that a civil
remedy for the theft of an article did not
lie, until the termination of the criminal

prosecution, and if brought within six
years after such termination, it was not
barred by the statute of limitations.
Whether the flight of John Fowler
would have justified the commencing of
the civil action before the criminal prosecution, it is unnecessary to decide, for the
71st section of the act of March 31, 1860,
P. L. 427, 1 P. & L. 1411, enacts that "in
all cases of felony heretofore committed, or
which may hereafter be committed, it
shall and may be lawful for any -person,
injured or aggrieved by such, felony, to
have and maintain his action, against the
person or persons guilty of such felony, in
like manner as if the offence committed
had not been feloniously done; and in no
case whatever shall the action of the party
injured be deemed, taken, or adjudged to
be merged in the felony, or in any manner
affected thereby." In view of this act,
neither the right of action is merged, nor
is the action postponed.
The absence of John Fowler from the
county did not make the service of the
summons on him impossible. He continued to reside here, and service at his
house, in the manner indicated by the act
of assembly, was as valid as service upon
himself. 1. Bright. Practice, 143. But
nothing is more firmly established than
that, if a defendant in fact appears, he
waives the defects in the mode of service
of the summons. I Bright. Practice, 148.
Fowler has caused able and zealous counsel to appear for him; they have pleaded
not guilty, and on the issue thus formed
there has been a trial. Had the service
been insufficient to give the court jurisdiction over Fowler he has himself conferred
that jurisdiction by thus appearing by attorney.
The motion for a new trial is therefore
overruled.
JOHN TATE vs. GEORGE TALBOT.
Contract in defraud of creditors-Assignment offuture wages-Liability of earning power to execution - WVhen intention
to defraud does not avoid the contractEjectment.
ISAIAH

ScOanELiNE

and

FRANK

J.

LAUBENSTEIN for the plaintiff.
The contract was an assignment of future earnings. It was for the purpose of
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defraudihg creditors and therefore void.
Emery v. Lawrence, 62 Mass. 151; Boylen
v. Leonard, 84 Mass. 408; Clark on Cont.
379. This is a violation of the statute of
fraudulent conveyances. Brightly's Purdon's Digest, Vol. 2, 2118. An assignment
of future earnings of a physician (as an
employee of his patients) is against public
policy. Woodring v. L. V. R. R., 2 Pa.
C. C. 465; Trumbower v. Ivery, 2 Pa. C. C.
470.
A. FRANK JOHN and B. JomNsoN MACEWEN for the defendant.
The constitutional right to sell his labor
for whatever price he desired.cannot be denied to Simons. Godcharles & Co. v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431 ; State v. Julow 129 Mo.
163; Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. kep. 310.
There cannot be, as against creditors, a
fraudulent conveyance of that which they
could not have reached. Burns v. Bangert, 92 Mo. 167; Davis v. Bessohl, 88 Mo.
436; Rhead v. Hounson, 46 Mich. 243;
Smith v. Rumsey, 33 Mich. 183; Abernathy v. Whitehead, 69 Mo. 28. Wages of
labor or salaries cannot be attached for
debt. Act of April 15, 1845. Catlin v.
Ensign, 29 Pa. 264; Hamberger v. Marcus,
157 Pa. 133. This exemption is founded
on public policy. Sweeny v. Hunter, 145
Pa. 371. And cannot be waived. Firmstone v. Mack, 49 Pa. 387; Beck v. Parker,
65 Pa. 262; U. S. v. Mertz, 2 Watts 406. A
sale is not fraudulent merely because of
intention to defraud. Jenkins v. Fowler,
24 Pa. 308; Adler et. al. v. Fenton et. al.,
65 U. S. 417; Kinnean v. Gealy et. al., 1
Penny. 284.
OPINION OF COURT.

William Simons had been a successful
physician, having much skill, experience
and reputation, but lost all his fortune in
speculation, and after the sale of all of his
property, remained in debt to the extent
of $25,000. A son-in-law, George Talbot,
hadjust graduated in medicine and because
any property that Simons might acquire
would be liable to seizure for his debts, an
agreement was formed between them, that
Simons should enter the employment of
Talbot, receive $1000 per year salary, attend
to all patients whom Talbot wished him
to attend, etc. People in the community
knowing of the arrangement and desiring
the services of Simons, employed Talbot,
Simons doing nearly all the visiting, prescribing, dispensing, etc. In 10 years the
average income of Talbot from the business was $10,000, out of which in addition
to the $1000 contracted for, he gave yearly
to Simons $1000.
Talbot invested the
moneys thus made in houses in the borough. At length, in the eleventh year of

their business relation, John Tate levies
an execution on the houses on a judgment
for $22,000, and a sheriff's sale of the houses
was made, he becoming the purchaser.
Talbot, of himself, would not have earned
more than an average of $700 during the
ten years.
The creditor is permitted, in Pennsylvania, to obtain satisfaction of his debt out
of various kinds of property. There is,
however, no levy allowed on the personal
powers of the debtor, upon his physical
strength or his technical skill; upon his
intelligence or his instinct. For torts it is
possible still to imprison the defendant,
but this is done simply in order to compel
him to pay the debt. The imprisonment
is not a substitute for, an equivalent of,
payment. William Simons was a man of
vigor, knowledge, skill and assiduity, and
these qualities, as the facts in this case-illustrate, have the power to earn money,
or to do work which has amonetary value.
The modern law, however, does not permit the creditor to reduce his debtor to
servitude in order that the latter may do
so laudable a thing as to pay his obligation. Simons was under no legal dutywith his moral duty we have nothing to do
-to exert his skill and force in the direct
service of his creditors. He might have
lain idle during the ten years of his service
for Talbot, useless to Talbot, useless to his
creditors, and useless to the sick and infirm, without infringing against any legal
prohibition.
But it might be true that a debtor while
not legally bound to exert his earning
power for the sake of his creditor, can not
exert that power except for the benefit of
such creditor. It is conceivable that the
law should say to the debtor, you cannot
be compelled to work, but, if you do, you
shall work for your creditor, either directly
or indirectly, by earning money or other
property which shall be available by him.
Has the law thus spoken?
The debtor is not compelled, if he works
at all, to work in the direct service of his
creditor.
No European jurisprudence
imposes such duty upon him. Certainly
the common law does not. Is he then
compelled, if he works, to work for compensation, and for such compensation as
shall be attachable, or for a compensation
which shall be spent in procuring leviable
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property ? The debtor may, if he chooses,
work for wages so small that they. yield
him a mere subsistence. If he does his
creditors will get no profit from his industry. In Welch v. Kline, 57 Pa. 428, a
husband worked for his wife, "He lived
with, and so far as appears, was maintained by his wife, and this was the only consideration for his services as agent." No
property of the wife, which she was in
part enabled to procure through this labor,
was leviable for his debts. Cf. Spering v.
Laughlin, 113 Pa. 209; Walker v. Jones,
148 Pa. 589; Sarah Harris v. Henry Hamline, 1 Forum, 113. "A man's creditors"
says Sharswood, J., 'have no lkgal claim
on his labor, unless his earnings are realized and invested in some kind of property, which can be reached by process of
execution." 57 Pa. 428. It would seem to
be clear that, if a husband can give all his
thought and time to his wife's business,
for his mere support, a father could do so
to his son-in-law's business. No less clear
is it that if he could reserve a support, he
could reserve a definite pecuniary compensation. The agreement then of William
Simons to work for George Talbot for $1000
per year, would not make the product of
his labor any more liable for his debts, than
it would have been, had Talbot agreed
simply to maintain him.
The motive of Simons and Talbot, in
making the arrangement between them,
was, to avoid exposing any property which
might be acquired by means of Simons
earnings, to seizure by his creditors. Does
this motive make illegal what, with a different motive would have been legal?
Instances are not infrequent, of the toleration or condemnation of an act, according as it is or is not accompanied by a certain motive or state of mind. A groundless
prosecution is actionable if malicious,
otherwise not. An unintended injury is
actionable, if the result of negligence. A
sale even for an inadequate price, of a
debtor's land, is valid, unless it was produced by the motive of evading or defrauding creditors. The criminal liablity for
many acts will depend on the purpose with
which they are done. The taking by B
of A's property, is not larceny, unless
there exists the animusfurandi. Aslight
stroke administered in affection, is not,
and administered in anger is, assault and

battery. A killing is murder only when
committed with "malice aforethought."
It does not follow therefore from the legal
right of a man who is indebted to give his
services to another without reward or for
a very inadequate reward, when it is not
his motive to prevent the satisfaction of
his creditors out of the fruits of his labor,
that he has a legal right so to give his services with such a motive.
It was suggested at the argument that as
the labor power of Simons could not itself
be taken in execution, and was therefore
not available by the creditors, he could
dispose of it by gift or otherwise, with
whatever motive. It has occasionally
been held that when property cannot be
taken in execution it can be disposed of
freely under the influence of any motive.
Thus a homestead may be effectually disposed of even with a fraudulent intent.
Rhead v. Hounson, 46 Mich. 243; Smith v.
Rumsey, 33 Mich. 183; 8 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. 758. The contrary however is indicated in Currier v Sutherland, 54 N. H.
475. As to pension money see Holmes v.
Tallada, 125 Pa. 133. The principle isnot
universal, certainly, that if one thing cannot be taken in execution, its products
cannot be. Labor produces wages. The
wages could.be attached, save for the prohibition of the act of April 15, 1845; 1 P. &
L. 1946, although the labor power could
not be subjected in any way to the claims
of creditors and though the wages are now
exempt from execution, chattels or lands
bought by them are not exempt. Money
on the person cannot be levied on, section
25, act 16 June, 1836, 1 P. & L2. 1918, but
the same money if it be separated from
the person can be, Herron's Appeal, 29 Pa.
240; Sullivan v. Tinker, 140 Pa. 35; Rudy
v. Commonwealth, 35 Pa. 166. At common law the debtor's choses in action
could not be levied upon, but if they were
exchanged for or converted into chattels,
the chattels could be seized in execution.
The immunity therefore of a thing from
levy in execution does not imply a similar
immunity of that which is procured by
means of it.
We have discovered no case in which a
state of facts similar to this has undergone
consideration. So far as we know, it has
never been held that A cannot devote his
time, intelligence and skill to B, in a busi-
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ness conducted by B, for any consideration,
adequate or inadequate, although a prepondefant motive might have been to prevent the fruit of his labors from being
taken by his creditors. In the cases cited
supra, in whi.h the indebted husband
gave his services to his wife, there was reason to suppose that he would not have
done this, could he have safely acquired
property for himself. The law has forbidden a debtor's conveying tangible property, real, chattels, choses in action, for the
purpose of putting it where it cannot be
levied upon. It has not yet forbidden the
gift or sale of his labor; although his
motives in making the gift or sale was in
part to make the acquisition from his
labor available to his wife or daughter,
rather than to his creditors.
It must be recalled that the houses levied upon by John Tate were not the product of the wages of William Simons.
Simons got $2000 per year from Talbot, but
what became of it does not appear. None
of it was invested in the Talbot houses.
These houses were bought by money which,
as between Simons and Talbot, was never
Simons', and which was procured by the
services of Simons, already sold to Talbot
for $1000 per annum.
It is evident then, that no error was
committed in the trial of the case, and the
plaintiifs rule for a new trial is discharged.
THOMAS HIPPLE vs. JOHN WEST-

WILLIAM LASCAR vs. JOHN WEST.
Assignment for creditors-Payments by.
assignee-Auditor's report-Statute of
Limitations-Toll of the statute.
Assumpsib.
PAUL J. SCHMIDT and RALPH H.
LIGHT for plaintiffs.
1. An auditor's finding as to a judgment is alleged to be conclusive. Baird v.
Ford, 152 Pa. 637; Bicking's Appeal, 2
Brewster, 202; Haines v. Burr, I Fhila. 52.
2. A decree entered upon the confirmation of an auditor's report is conclusive as
to the questions determined. De Wolfis
Estate 181 Pa. 157; Donaldson's Estate,
158 Pa. 292; Hughes' Estate, 176 Pa. 387.
3. The statute of limitations does not
apply to claims against the assigned estate
not barred when the assignment was made.
Trickett on Assignments, ?.60 & 189.
GEORGE W. BlTsoN and EDWIN G.
HUToHINSON for the defendant.

1. A part payment by the assignee of
an insolvent debtor will not toll the statute. Bunn & Raignel v. Drovin, 2 Phila.
306.
2. The plaintiffs have failed to show
any evidence of the payment of any money
within six years. Partial payment must
be made by the debtor or his agent legally
Trickett on Limitations,
authorized.
Sect. 260.
Estate of
3. Other cases cited are:
Daniel Light, 136 Pa. 211; Kline's Appeal.
86 Pa. 363; Gunther's Appeal, 4 W. N. C,
41; Irvin's Appeal, 109 Pa. 391.
OPINION OF COURT.
On 3rd January, 1879, West gave to
Hipple a note for $500 payable on April 1st,
1880, and on Dee 9th. 1879, another for
$475 to William Lascar, payable in four
months. On Feb. 19th, 1881, West made
an assignment for the benefit of creditoi-s.
The assignee filed an accounton April 1st,
1887, an auditor was appointed to make
distribution, and on Nov. 16th, 1887, supdry claims were presented to him, among
which were the aforesaid notes. The execution of these notes by West was contested
and evidence taken thereon. A point was
made as to the statute of limitations, and
the claimants gave proof of partial payments within six years, and after the assignment. The auditor decided that the
notes were genuine, were not paid, and
that the statute of limitations was not a
bar, and awarded 40 per cent. to them, as
as well as to other claims. On April 15th,
1890, another account was filed by the
assignee, and on May 13th, 1890, took place
a. hearing before the auditor. The notes
were again presented, again contested, as
not genuine, and as barred by the statute
of limitations. Again the auditor awarded
a dividend of 30 per cent. These actions
by Hipple and Lascar, are brought against
West to recover the residue of the debt.
The defendant denies the execution of the
notes, and insists that the action is barred.
The plea of the defendant denies that he
executed the notes. The only evidence
that he did execute them, furnished by
the plaintiff is the two adjudications by
the auditor and by the court of common
pleas, in confirming his report. When the
notes were presented before the auditor,
their genuineness was attacked. Evidence
in support and in denial of the genuineness
was received and the decision was reached
that the notes were genuine. The con-
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firmation of this decision by the common
pleas was an adjudication, and, as stch, it
precludes any fresh contestation over the
genuineness of the notes between the
same parties. It is true that the ultimate
decision, the judgment, of the court was
that Ripple should receive 70 per cent.
of the note; and that the present action is
not for that 70 per cent. but for the remaining 30 per cent. But, the right to recover
the 70 per cent. as that to recover the 30
per cent. depended on the same fact, the
execution of the notes by West. One adjudication of that fact precludes the parties
to it from again disputing it. Ajudgment
for the interest of a note is conclusive, in a
second action for the principal, that the
note was not void for usury. Newton v.
Hook, 48 N. Y. 676; 2 Wharton. Evidence
784. A decision in an action on a coupon
that the bond to which it is attached is
invalid, is conclusive, in later actions on
other coupons of the same bond or of other
b6nds issued at the same time under the
same circumstances. Bissell v. Spring
Valley Township, 124 U. S. 225; Block v.
Bourbon Co. 99 U. S. 686. Similarly, arecovery on one note, growing out of a sale
of land is conclusive, in a later action on
another note having the same origin, Mason Lumber Co. v. Buchtel, 101 U. S.
638. To the investigation before the auditor, the assignor as well as the claimant
and other creditors are parties. In this
action the claimant and the assignor are
again parties. The genuineness of the
note has therefore been irrefragably established. Sheppard's Estate, 180 Pa. 57.
The other defence is based upon the
statute of limitations. The note became
payable in April 1880, and this action was
not commenced until ten years had elapsed
since that time. Before the auditor partial payments, made since the assignment
for creditors, and within six years before
the hearing, were proven. The decision of
the auditor is probably decisive that such
payments were made. But, although that
decision was conclusive that the payments
were made within six years before presentation of the claims, it is not conclusive
that they were made within six years before the bringing of the present action.
An interval of time lay between presentation and the confirmation of the auditor's
report, and between the confirmation of

the auditor's report and the bringing of
this suit. These payments, therefore, will
not toll the statute.
But, tie assignee made two partial payments, in conformity with the decree of
the court. Will these payments toll the
statute? Plainly not. They were made
not by the assignor, but against his will.
He denied the right of the claimants to a
dividend, asserting that the notes were
forged, and insisting upon the statute of
limitations. A partial payment tolls the
statute, only because it is a recognition of
the debt, and implies a promise to pay it.
West repudiated the debt, and manifested
a purpose not to pay it. The .assignee's
payment, therefore, can have no effect on
the application of the statute; Sheppard's
Estate, 180 Pa. 57; Light's Estate, 136 Pa.
211; Reber's Appeal, 125 Pa. 20.
It remains to consider whether the adjudication, as such, of the common pleas,
upon the auditor's report, stops the further
application of the statute. The statute
does not run against judgments, nor
against actions which have been begun.
If the present action is to be considered as
a continuation of the claim against the assigned fund, the operation of the statute
was arrested, when the claim was presented to the auditor. But, this action cannot
be considered a continuation of the claim.
That claim was of a dividend out of the
assigned fund. The decree awarded that
dividend. The decree was an adjudication
as to that dividend, and not as to the residue of the note. If two notes are given
for parts of the same debt, a judgment on
one would not be an adjudication upon
the other, and against the latter, the limitation could be pleaded, if six years had
elapsed before the suit upon it, despite the
intervening judgment on the other. The
adjudication was against the assigned
fund only; Light's Estate, 136 Pa. 211. In
Raeders' Appeal, 167 Pa. 597, an award to a
creditor, from a fund in the hands of a
lunatic's committee, shown in a partial account, was not an adjudication, which
prevented the setting up of the statute of
limitations, when the creditor sought another dividend, on the settlement of the
committee's final account. While Judge
Rice says that ''it (i. e. the first award) was
not such an adjudiciation as would preclude inquiry into the validityof the claim
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in an action at law against the ward after
being restored to reason, or in distribution
of the fund in the committee's hands as
shown by his final account," the only objection to the claim was that it had been
barred by the statute. The case teaches in
substance, that the last proceeding to obtain a dividend is not to be treated as continuous or identical with the first. In
Reber's Appeal, 125 Pa. 20, notes due in
1878, were awarded a dividend in 1883, out
of the estate of the deceased insolvent
maker. It was held that the residue of the
notes could be collected three or fouryears
later, by setting it off against a claim of
the deceased against the payee. The
statute of limitations had not run in 1883.
Paxon, C. J., says referring to the award
of 1883, "there was an adjudication and
allowance of the claim, and a payment on
account in pursuance thereof. The liability of the maker of the notes was thus established by the decree of the Orphans'
Court. The auditor is but the hand of
that court, and his decree becomes the decree of that court. * * I concede the
position of the court below that this was
not a re-assumption to pay the notes, and
that an administrator cannot make such a
promise. It is not, however, a question of
re-assumption. It is a question of adjudication of the establishment of the claim
in the orphans' court. When" so established the statute has no application."
This apparently means, that when a note
is presented in order to obtain a partial
payment of it, in the orphans' court, and
the partial payment is received, the note
transit in rem. judicatam, so that, if it is
ever presented again, at any distance of
time, for the residue, the statute of limitations ceases to have application. But the
same result does not follow a similar adjudication in any other court. R~der's Appeal, 157 Pa. 597; Light's Estate, 136 Pa. 211.
While then, the adjudication on the account of 1887, is conclusive of the genuineness of the notes, and possibly that the stattute of limitations had not barred them, it
ascertains nothing as to their being barred
now. Inasmuch as the notes are ten years
old, the burden is on the plaintiffofproving
the facts that would exempt them from
the limitations. These facts have not
been proven. On the reserved point judgment is therefore entered for the defendant.

CHAS. JOHNSON vs. JOHN THOMAS
and HEZEKIAH TURNER.
Liability of surety-Agreement between
creditor andprincipaldebtor for extension of time- Usury-Consent of surety.
Petition for rule to discharge surety.
WILLIAMr A. JORDAN and IARITIN F.
DUFFY for the rule.
1. There was an agreement between
the principal debtor and creditor to extend
time of payment without consent of surety. Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol. 24,
p. 822; Henderson v. Ardery, 36 Pa. 449;
Hutchinson v. Woodwell, 107 Pa. 509;
Hill v. Witmer, 2 Phila. 72; Sawyers v.
Hicks, 6 Watts. 76; Van Horn v. Dick,
151 Pa. 341, Siebeneck v. Anchor Savings
Bank, 111 Pa. 187; Calvert v. Good, 95 Pa.
65.
2. There was a consideration for extension. Miller v. Stein, 2 Pa. 286; Brubaker
v. Okeson, 36 Pa. 519; Grayson's Appeal,
108 Pa. 581; Riddle v. Thompson, 104 Pa.
330.
3. The time for extension was definite.
Miller v. Stein, 12 Pa. 383; Clippinger V.
Creps, 2 Watts 45; Uhler v. Applegate, 26
Pa. 140.

W. LLOYD SNYDER and RALPH H.
LIGHT contra.
Giving time by oral agreement cannot
have any greater legal effect than a covenant by a creditor not to sue for a specified time one or more debtors. Such a
covenant is not a release and furnishes no
defence. Schenck's Appeal, 94 Pa. 37.
STATEMlENT OF THE CASE.
For a valuable consideration, a note is
given by John Thomas and Charles Johnson (the latter as surety) to Hezekiah Turner, for $500 payable June 30. '94, with a
warrant of attorney attached for the confession of judgment.
On the 6th of July, '94, John Thomas
pays to H. Turner a bonus of $3 for a 30
day's extension or forbearance which H.
Turner accepts, agreeing to the-forbearance.
Tuesday after the expiration of the entension, Thomas pays Turner $2 as a bonus
for a further extension of 20 days. Of
neither of these agreements to extend had
Charles Johnson any knowledge. Before
the expiration of the second period of extension, Johnson notifies Turner to enter
judgment and collect the note, by execution against the property of Thomas, and
two weeks after receiving the notice the
judgment is entered. Susequentlytothe
entry of the judgment, Johnson learns of
the agreement to extend the time of payment between Thomas and Turner, and
therefore petitions the Court for a rule to
open the judgment as to him and permit
him to defend on the ground that he has
been discharged.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Charles Johnson became surety for John
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Thomas. He seeks to discharge himself,
as such, because of the agreement between
Hezekiah Turner, the creditor, and
Thomas, for an extension of the term of
credit. This agreementwas notmadewith
the knowledge of Johnson. Has he been
released by it? An agreement for time
will discharge the surety, if (1) it is without'his consent, (2) the agreement is for
an extension which is definite as to tifue.
Shaffstall v. McDaniel, 152 Pa. 598; Van
Horne v. Dick, 151 Pa. 341; Riddle v.
Thompson, 104 Pa. 330; (3) this agreement
is binding because supported by a consideration; Grayson's Appeal, 108 Pa. 581;
Siebeneck v. Anchor Savings Bank, 111
Pa. 187; Calverts v. Good, 95 Pa. 65;
Hartman v. Danner, 74 Pa. 36; and (4)
there is no reservation in the agreement
between the creditor and the principal, of
the right of the former to pursue the
surety, notwithstanding the extension to
the principal. If the credit or expressly
stipulates for the right to immediately
pursue the surety, the latter is not discharged. Hagey v. Hill, 75 Pa. 108; Calvert v. Good, 95 Pa. 65.
Let us see whether these properties are
found in the agreement between Turner
and Thomas.
(1.) Johnson did not learn of the agreement, and consequently did not assent to
it, until after it had been made. He has not
assented to it since he learned of it.
(2.) The agreements were for an extension definite as to time. That of July 6,
1894, was for 30 days, and that of August
6, 1894, was for 20 days.
(3.) Were the agreements binding? To
make them binding, a consideration was
necessary. Payment of lawful interest for
the 30 days, or the 20 days, in advance,
would be such a consideration as would
make it the duty of the creditor to abstain
from suit during the periods; Grayson's
Appeal, 108 Pa. 581; Siebeneck v. Anchor
Savings Bank, 111 Pa. 187. So, an agree
ment to pay the next year's interest,
whenever called on for it by the creditor,
even before the expiration of the year,
will be a consideration for the agreement
to wait until the expiration of that year;
Calvert v. Good, 95 Pa. 65. Payment of
interest in advance, is not usury, Vahlberg v. Keaton, (Ark.) 4 L. R. A. 462. On
the other hand, payment of a sum of
money as interest in excess of the legal
rate, will constitute no consideration, because the whole of it will be instantly applied by the law to the lawful interest or
to the principal, then due. Calvert v.
Good, 95 Pa. 65; Hartman v. Danner, 74
Pa. 36. In the earlier of these cases, the
principal debtor agreed to pay 8 per cent.
interest for an extension of time, and gave
a due bill for the two per cent. in excess
of the legal rate. Says Sharswood J.,
"what effect then did the payment of the
due-bill given just before the maturity of
the note produce?" Assuming it to have
been paid after the note had fallen due,
it was in law a part payment on account

of the debt and lawful interest. Such is
clearly the provision of the act of Mlay 28,
1858; P. L. 622: "It shall be lawful for
such borrower or debtor, at his option, to
retain and deduct such excess from the
amount of any such debt." What the
principal had a right to deduct as payment, the surety may certainly avail himself of it. It follows, logically, that the
payment of this due-bill-and the same
principle applies to the subsequent paynment in goods-having been made after
the maturity of the debt, formed no sufficient consideration for the contract to give
further time."1 If the $3.00 paid for a 30 day
extension was interest for the 30 days, $2.50
was lawful, and 50 cents usurious. The 50
cents would be applied to the principal,
and would not be a consideration for the
agreement to extend the time, but the
$2.50 would be a good consideration for the
extension for the 30 days.
The $3 and the $2, however, were paid
as a "bonus" for the extension. A bonus
is "an allowance in addition to what is
usual, current or stipulated," (Standard
Dictionary, ad verb.) "something of the
nature of an honorarium or voluntary additional compensation for a service or advantage; a sum given or paid over and
above what is required to be paid, or is
regularly payable," (Century Diet. ad
verbum). A special sense, mentioned in
this dictionary is ' premium paid for a
loan." The same definition is found in
Webster's International. In Wahlbergv.
Keaton, 4 L.. R. A. 462, a sum of money
paid to an agent for procuring a loan on
which the highest rate of interest was paid
to the lender, is called a "bonus." Of.,
also, Blyiner v. Colvin, 127 Pa. 114. The
$3 and $2 paid to Turner cannot be considered as paid on account of lawful interest, but on the footing of an additional
premium to him, the lawful interest running at the same time. It follows that
they.must be regarded as the due bill for
the two per cent. in excess of six per cent.
in Hartman v. Danner, 74 Pa. 36; viz., as
interest in excess of six per cent., and a
partial payment of the accrued lawful interest and principal, Cf. Grayson's Appeal,
108 Pa. 581. They furnished therefore, no
consideration for the promise to extend the
time. In spite of them Turner could have
sued at any time. Johnson is therefore
not discharged.
The discharge of the surety by the giving of time by the creditor would be a good
cause for opening the judgment, in order
to allow the surety an opportunity to make
this defense, Grayson's Appeal, 108 Pa.
581. The entry of the judgment was requested by Johnson, but he so requested
in ignorance that lie had been discharged,
and for the purpose of compelling payment
by the principal debtor, Thomas. He is
not estopped on discovering that he had
been discharged, from petitioning for the
opening of the judgment.
The petition is dismissed and the rule
discharged.

